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THE FATE OF THE NATIVE HAWAIIANS: THE SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP DOCTRINE, THE PROBLEM OF
STRICT SCRUTINY, AND OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY
RICE V CAYETANO
I. INTRODUCTION
Harold "Freddy" Rice is a Native Hawaiian in the sense that he
was born in the Hawaiian Islands and can "trace[ ] his ancestry to
two members of the legislature of the Kingdom of Hawaii, prior to
the Revolution of 1893."1 He is a taxpayer and a qualified elector
of the United States, the State of Hawaii, and the County of Ha-
waii.2 When Rice applied to vote in the 1996 election for the trus-
tees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA"), however, his ap-
plication was denied.4 Why? Because, according to a state statute,
he was not Hawaiian enough.5
Almost a century before Rice was denied a vote in the OHA
elections, the last queen of Hawaii signed an official protest to the
United States Annexation Resolution,6 in which the Republic of
1. Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1548 (D. Haw. 1997), affd, 146 F.3d 1075
(9th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
2. Id.
3. The OHA is a state agency designed to improve the living conditions of Native
Hawaiians using revenues from ceded lands. See HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
4' Rice, 528 U.S. at 498.
5. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 13D-3 (1993) (defining the electorate allowed to vote as in-
cluding only "Hawaiians" and "Native Hawaiians"). The pertinent part of the Code of Ha-
waii defines "Hawaiians" as "any descendant of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Ha-
waiian Islands which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in
1778, and which peoples thereafter have continued to reside in Hawaii." Id. § 10-2. "Native
Hawaiians" are defined as "any descendant of not less than one-half part of the races in-
habiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778, as defined by the Hawaiian Homes Com-
mission Act, 1920, as amended." Id. The Supreme Court opinion also includes a discussion
of the various definitions critical to the case. Rice, 528 U.S. at 509-10.
6. Lili'uokalani, Official Protest to the Treaty of Annexation (June 17, 1897) avail-
able at httpl//www.hawaii-nation.org/treatyprot.html. Lili'uokalani also protested the An-
nexation Act because it confiscated 4,000,000 acres of Hawaiian lands that were
technically called the crown lands, those legally entitled thereto... receiving
no consideration whatever for estates, their title to which has been always
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Hawaii ceded 1,800,000 acres of "public, Government, or Crown
lands" to the United States.' In her written protest, signed in
Washington, D.C., on June 17, 1897, Queen Lili'uokalani pro-
nounced the annexation "wrong toward the native and part-
native people of Hawaii" and "an act of gross injustice."'
Queen Lili'uokalani's declaration echoed the hopes of all world
leaders: that their nations' sovereignties are immortal. History
offers a different story, however, one of bigger sovereigns swal-
lowing up smaller ones in pursuit of geographic and cultural
dominance. A century after England's Captain Cook made land-
fall in Hawaii in 1778,9 Queen Lili'uokalani's monarchy was over-
thrown with the aid of American forces.' ° Later, in 1898, America
successfully annexed Hawaii and established the islands as a
separate Republic to be part of the United States." The Admis-
sion Act of 1959 sealed Hawaii's fate by establishing it as Amer-
ica's fiftieth state. 2
If Native Hawaiians felt their sovereignty besmirched by
American encroachment, perhaps they found some solace in a
1993 Joint Resolution in which Congress officially apologized for
America's participation in "the illegal overthrow of the kingdom
of Hawaii."8
The foregoing has a good deal to do with Harold "Freddy"
undisputed, and which is legitimately in my name at this date.
[The] treaty ignores, not only all professions of perpetual amity and good
faith made by the United Staets [sic] in former treaties with the sovereigns
representing the Hawaiian people, but all treaties made by those sovereigns
with other and friendly powers, and it is thereby in violation of international
law.
Id. The Annexation Resolution may be found at J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 750
(1898).
7. J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 750 (1898).
8. Lili'uokalani, supra note 6, at 1. See generally HELENA G. ALLEN, THE BETRAYAL
OF LILi'uOKALANI: LAST QUEEN OF HAWAII 1838-1917 (1982); The American Perspective:
Lili'uokalani's Legacy (PBS television broadcast, 1990). Of the fate of Hawaiian sover-
eignty, Queen Lili'uokalani wrote: "The cause of Hawaii and independence is larger and
dearer than the life of any man connected with it. Love of country is deep-seated in the
breast of every Hawaiian, whatever his station." Hawaii: Independent & Sovereign, avail-
able at http://www.hawaii-nation.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2000).
9. RALPH S. KUYKENDALL & A. GROVE DAY, HAWAII: A HISTORY 14 (2d ed. 1949).
10. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 505 (2000).
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510, 1513 (1993).
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Rice.' 4 It paints in broad strokes the historical context behind
Rice v. Cayetano, a case in which the Supreme Court struck
down a Hawaii voting restriction that permitted only persons
with Native Hawaiian blood to vote for the trustees of the OHA.'6
A case that mixes race, history, and evolving constitutional
doctrine, Rice reflects the Rehnquist Court's crusade against gov-
ernment programs that offer preferences to racial minorities who
have faced discrimination in the past. 7 It also marks the first
time the Court has used the Fifteenth Amendment, which was
adopted after the Civil War to protect African-Americans, to pro-
tect the voting rights of a white man.
8
In Rice, the Supreme Court expressly avoided a ripe opportu-
nity to articulate what, if any, special relationship Native Ha-
waiians enjoy with the federal government. Specifically, the
Court rejected out-of-hand the notion that Native Hawaiians are
analogous to Indian tribes and are thereby entitled to the same
types of self-governmental programs with racial preferences as
the Indians. 9 Reversing both the District Court for the District of
Hawaii and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,2" the Supreme
Court declined to even consider whether Native Hawaiians are
Native Americans in the legal sense.2' Put another way, the
Court was blind to the more than 160 congressional laws that ex-
pressly include Native Hawaiians in the same category as Native
14. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Weigh Race Barrier in Hawaiian Voting, N.Y.
TnfEs, Mar. 23, 1999, at A18.
15. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
16. Id. at 495-97.
17. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see also Joan Biskupic, Hawaiian Voting
Limit Rejected; Court Strikes Down Race-Based Selection of Agency Trustees, WASH. POST,
Feb. 24, 2000, at A9.
18. Biskupic, supra note 17.
19. Rice, 528 U.S. at 518-19. Compare Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and
the Special Relationship: The Case of the Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537 (1996) (ar-
guing that under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, government programs designed to
benefit Native Hawaiians must be analyzed under the most heightened level of scrutiny),
with Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. &
POLaY REV. 95 (1998) (arguing that programs designed to benefit Native Hawaiians should
be examined using the same level of review that applies to programs for other Native
Americans). For purposes of clarity and simplicity, the terms "Native American" and "In-
dian" are used synonymously in this note, except where a distinction is warranted.
20. Rice, 528 U.S. at 511.
21. Id. at 518.
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Indians, thus according them the same special protection.22
Native American jurisprudence makes clear that the Indian
tribes enjoy a "quasi-sovereign," or "special relationship," with the
federal government. 3 This "special relationship" tends to militate
against equal protection challenges to government programs with
preferences designed to benefit Indians.24 Accordingly, the Court
has routinely upheld government programs that give preferences
to Indian tribes since such classifications are rooted not in racial
classifications, but in political or legal status.2
Because the classification of Native Americans is not racial, the
Court has applied mere rational basis review analysis to govern-
ment programs that single out Native Americans for special
treatment.26 Under the rational basis review scheme, the gov-
ernment need only show that a particular program is reasonably
and rationally tied to the advancement of a governmental interest
for a court to uphold the constitutionality of the program.
Because the Court in Rice refused to articulate whether Native
Hawaiians enjoy the same "special relationship" with the gov-
ernment as the Indian tribes and are thus Native American in
the legal sense, it unbegrudgingly applied strict scrutiny to Ha-
waii's voting law and struck it down as unconstitutional on Fif-
teenth Amendment grounds. 2' By applying the most severe level
of scrutiny to Hawaii's voting law, the Court's decision in Rice
22. See infra note 103.
23. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979) ("'[Tjhe unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal
law permits the Federal Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, leg-
islation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive.'") (quoting Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977); United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) ("Indian tribes are unique aggregations pos-
sessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.") (construing
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832)). According to the court in Mancari:
Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes ... single[s] out
for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians .... If these laws, de-
rived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indi-
ans, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the
United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn
commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552 (1974).
24. See Yakima, 439 U.S. 463; Antelope, 430 U.S. 641; Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544.
25. See Yakima, 439 U.S. 463; Antelope, 430 U.S. 641; Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544.
26. See Yakima, 439 U.S. 463; Antelope, 430 U.S. 641; Mancari, 417 U.S. 535.
27. See Yakima, 439 U.S. 463; Antelope, 430 U.S. 641; Mancari, 417 U.S. 535.
28. Rice, 528 U.S. at 522.
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raises serious doubts about the future of programs designed to
benefit Native Hawaiians. For one, the decision calls into ques-
tion whether various lower court decisions which recognize that
Native Hawaiians have the same legal status as other native
peoples would survive if challenged in the wake of Rice.29
Another reading of the case suggests, however, that the Rice
decision is but a logical reaffirmation of the Court's reasoning in
its recent redistricting cases, ° which sharply define the Constitu-
tion's strict prohibition against using race as a condition of vot-
ing.31
Still, fear that future legislation designed to benefit Native
Hawaiians will face strict scrutiny in the courts may be legiti-
mate for one principal reason. The Court refused to hear Rice's
equal protection claim, arguing instead that Hawaii's voting law
ran patently afoul of the Fifteenth Amendment.32 The Court nev-
ertheless assumed, without deciding, that Hawaii could treat Na-
tive Hawaiians as an Indian tribe.33 Thus, the Court's application
of strict scrutiny suggests, albeit implicitly, that programs de-
signed to benefit Native Hawaiians will be subject to this most
exacting level of review in the future.
The Rice decision is also quite significant in light of the impor-
tant issues with which the Court chose not to wrestle: namely,
whether the Native Hawaiians enjoy equal status with the fed-
eral government as Native Indians specifically, and Native
Americans generally.34 In short, the Court's silence on this impor-
tant issue suggests that Native Hawaiians are not Native Ameri-
cans, do not enjoy the same "special relationship" with the federal
government as the Indian tribes, and are not subject to the same
rights and privileges of tribal Indian sovereigns.
This note examines the analysis behind, and potential impact
of, the Rice decision. Part II provides a brief history of the Fif-
teenth Amendment and its evolution since its post-Civil War
29. See, e.g., Ahuna v. Dep't of Hawaiian Home Lands, 640 P.2d 1161, 1168-69 (Haw.
1982).
30. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (concerning North Carolina congres-
sional districts).
31. See infra note 42.
32. Rice, 528 U.S. at 522.
33. See id. at 524 (Breyer, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 518.
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adoption. Part III discusses the historical backdrop of Rice, in-
cluding an overview of the significant historical events under-
girding the law as it applies to Native Hawaiians. The Rice deci-
sion itself is set forth and explained in Part IV. Part V analyzes
and critiques the Rice decision; emphasis is placed on the com-
peting interests involved in the case, and whence those interests
find legal support. Finally, Part VI discusses the impact of the
Rice decision on future challenges to laws designed to benefit Na-
tive Hawaiians specifically, and Native Americans generally.
II. THE LAW LURKING BEHIND THE VOTING FRANCHISE
A. Color Blind Democracy? The Fifteenth Amendment
The right to vote is a firmly rooted right essential to the orches-
tration of American democracy. The Supreme Court has sounded
this chorus by holding that the voting right is "preservative of
other basic civil and political rights."35 While the right to vote is a
fundamental one, various amendments have been added to the
U.S. Constitution that both circumscribe and expand the fran-
chise's force and effect.36 These amendments essentially amount
to restrictions on the abilities of states to impose franchise re-
quirements on voting schemes.37 For example, the Nineteenth
Amendment prohibits gender discrimination in voting,3" the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits the states from imposing a
poll tax as a condition of voting,39 and the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment grants the right to vote to all citizens over the age of eight-
een.
40
Adopted in 1870 as the last of the Civil War Amendments,4' the
35. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
36. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
14.31 (5th ed. 1995).
37. See id.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
in any primary or other election... shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.").
40. U.S. CONST. amend XXVI, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of age.").
41. The Civil War Amendments, added to the Constitution to help remedy the une-
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Fifteenth Amendment prohibits states from abridging or denying
a citizen's right to vote on the basis of race." Despite the express
language of the Fifteenth Amendment, over the years states have
devised clever, and sometimes not so clever, schemes that dis-
criminate against minorities.'
In the White Primary Cases, the Court made clear that a state
could not exclude a minority race from the voting franchise.' The
White Primary Cases represent the premise that "all integral
steps in an election for public office are public functions and
therefore state action subject to some constitutional scrutiny."45
In sum, these cases hold that "an election for public office is a
public function and that any integral part of that function must
conform to the Constitution."46
Some of the White Primary Cases involved elections by politi-
cal parties for purposes of future general elections.' In Grovey v.
Townsend,' the Court upheld a voting restriction based on race.49
The Court noted that no state laws existed that governed state
political parties, and the fact that the Texas Democratic Conven-
tion barred blacks from voting in its primaries did not constitute
qual vestiges of slavery, also include the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. See
generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 36, § 14.7. The Thirteenth Amendment provides
that "Inleither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The Fourteenth
Amendment was added partly to ensure that former slaves could become fifll U.S. citizens
and to entitle them to due process and equal protection. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 36, § 14.7 at 642-43.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.").
43. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (involving a gerrymandered
city district designed solely to fence out black voters from municipal boundaries and deny
them the right to vote in city elections); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (involving a
primary conducted by a private organization operating without the color of state aid, and
excluding blacks from participation); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (involving a
party convention resolution forbidding blacks from voting in a party primary regulated by
the state) [hereinafter White Primary Cases].
44. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 36, § 14.31 at 878.
45. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 36, § 14.33 at 896.
46. NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 36, § 14.33 at 898.
47. Terry, 345 U.S. 461; Allwright, 321 U.S. 649.
48. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
49. Id. at 55.
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state action.5' Less than a decade later, the Court overruled
Grovey.
51
In Smith v. Allwright,52 the Court struck down a resolution
that prohibited African-Americans from voting in a party primary
regulated by the state.53 The Court reasoned that when a state
delegated to a political party the power to create voting qualifica-
tions, the state had in essence turned the party's action into state
action.54
The Court broadened its analysis of racial requirements in
elections in Terry v. Adams,55 a case that involved a racially dis-
criminatory primary held by a party operating without the color
of state action. 6 The private primary was held for the purpose of
excluding African-Americans prior to the Democratic primary.'
The fact that the private party did not act under the color of state
action did not seem to bother the Court. Writing for the majority,
Justice Black held that the mere fact that a state allowed a pri-
vate device-the racial bar to African-Americans--otherwise for-
bidden in a state election, violated the Fifteenth Amendment."
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,59 the Court considered whether an
Alabama statute that altered the shape of the city of Tuskegee
from a square to a twenty-eight sided figure, effectively excluding
some 400 black voters (but no white voters) from the city, violated
the Fifteenth Amendment.60 The Court, recognizing both the ra-
cial effect of and the purpose behind the law, held that it was un-
constitutional.6
50. Id. at 52-53.
51. See Allwright, 321 U.S. at 666.
52. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
53. Id. at 656-57, 666.
54. Id. at 664-65 (stating that the constitutional "grant to the people of the opportu-
nity for choice is not to be nullified by a State through casting its electoral process in a
form which permits a private organization to practice racial discrimination in the elec-
tion").
55. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
56. See id. at 463.
57. Id. at 464.
58. Id. at 469.
59. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
60. Id. at 340-41.
61. Id. at 347-48.
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More recently, in Shaw v. Reno,62 the Court considered whether
North Carolina's legislative map for the election of members of
Congress, which promoted the interests of minority voters, consti-
tuted an offense to the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause.63 The map created two congressional districts with Afri-
can-American majorities, one of which was 160 miles long and,
according to the majority, "no wider than the 1-85 corridor."' In a
five-four decision, the Court held that those opposing the gerry-
mandered districts had effectively made out a Fourteenth
Amendment claim.65 However, the Court stated that race-
conscious decision-making may be permissible in certain circum-
stances.66 For example, if the state had created reasonably com-
pact second majority-minority districts that followed political
subdivision lines, the district map may have withstood a Fif-
teenth Amendment challenge.67 However, the mere fact that the
state used race as the only criteria for one of the districts com-
pelled strict scrutiny, the most heightened level of review, dis-
cussed in Part V.
Shaw represents a departure from traditional challenges to the
voting franchise inasmuch as the Court gave greater weight to
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee than to
the facial constraints imposed by the Fifteenth Amendment.6"
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor implied that all Fif-
teenth Amendment challenges necessarily involve equal protec-
tion inquiries.69 Indeed, Justice O'Connor crystallized the very
meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment and its implicit equal pro-
tection guarantee as follows:
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our
society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of
our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their
skin. Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular
dangers. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may
balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us
62. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
63. Id. at 633-34, 642.
64. Id. at 635.
65. Id. at 642.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 657.
68. Id. at 642.
69. Id.
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further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer
matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.
70
It is quite clear, then, that the Fifteenth Amendment acts as a
complete bar to using race as a condition of voting. The amend-
ment's evolution over the last century demonstrates the Court's
progression toward extinguishing the socio-political indignities
that characterized the Civil War era. While the Fifteenth
Amendment is both expressly clear and unambiguous in its lan-
guage, we shall see instances where the Court, and Congress,
have carved out exceptions to the voting franchise.
B. Interested Voters: The Special Purpose Election
While four constitutional amendments place restrictions on the
ability of states to impose conditions on the voting franchise,"' the
Supreme Court originally interpreted the U.S. Constitution to
suggest that states possess an inherent constitutional authority
to control the electoral process.72
For instance, despite the Fifteenth Amendment's blanket pro-
hibition against using race as a condition of voting, the Supreme
Court has suggested that a state might legitimately limit an elec-
tion to interested voters and restrict the electorate to only those
citizens on whom the election would have a disproportionate im-
pact.73
70. Id. at 657.
71. Specifically, the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
72. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 36, § 14.31. Article I, Section 2 of
the Constitution requires electors for members of the House of Representatives to meet
the same qualifications as "[e]lectors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legisla-
ture." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Article II, Section one, along with the Twelfth and Twentieth
Amendments, lay out the process for electing the President and Vice President. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1. Specifically, states are given discretion in the manner of selecting the
members of the Electoral College. Id. Article II, Section 1 states, in pertinent part:
Each state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may di-
rect, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Rep-
resentatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Sena-
tor or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the
United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
Id.
73. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dis-
trict,4 residents of a California water storage district challenged
the constitutionality of a voter qualification that allowed only
landowners to vote in storage district elections. 5 The Court per-
mitted the voting scheme for officers of the water storage district,
limited as it was to landowners, with each vote cast assessed pro-
portionately to the value of the landowner's land. 6 Taking a more
circumscribed view of the election's "purpose," the Court found
that the water storage district possessed limited authority, pro-
viding "no other general public services such as schools, housing,
transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordi-
narily financed by a municipal body."7"
The Court explained its "disproportionate" impact theory, not-
ing "[niot only does the district not exercise what might be
thought of as 'normal governmental' authority, but its actions
disproportionately affect landowners." 8
Thus, in Salyer and its progeny,79 the Court has articulated an
exception to state-imposed conditions on voting where the elec-
tion being held has a limited purpose which disproportionately
impacts a particular group. In such a case, the franchise may be
limited to that group. These exceptions expressly divorce from
their operation the "one person, one vote" mandate of the Four-
teenth Amendment. °
It is important to note that the "special purpose election" ex-
ception has not, so far, been applied in instances where the group
on whom an election disproportionately impacts is a racially dis-
tinct class. The definitional character of the electorate in "special
purpose elections" has to do only with ownership of real property.
III. ALOHA: WELCOME TO AMERICA-HISTORY
By 500 A.D., large bands of Polynesians from the South Pacific
74. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
75. Id. at 724-25.
76. Id. at 729.
77. Id. at 728-29.
78. Id. at 729.
79. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
80. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 522 (2000).
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had reached and settled in Hawaii."' Over the following centuries,
the Hawaiian way of life developed a sophisticated governmental
structure, a distinct social organization, and an economic system
largely characterized by wealthy chieftains who presided over
feudal holdings.8 2 The U.S. Congress has stated that "prior to the
arrival of the first Europeans in 1778, the Native Hawaiian peo-
ple lived in a highly organized, self-sufficient, subsistent social
system based on communal land tenure with a sophisticated lan-
guage, culture, and religion." 3
When Captain Cook made landfall in the Sandwich Islands in
1778, at the same time the American colonies were fighting for
their own independence 5,000 miles away, the Native Hawaiian
population exceeded 300,000.84 At this time, there existed in Ha-
waii "a feudal type of land ownership system" in which "tenants
were considered to have 'rights' with respect to the land." 5
In 1893, the Kingdom of Hawaii was overthrown with the aid of
American forces.86 An interim government known as the Republic
of Hawaii was set up in opposition to the Hawaiian government
under Hawaii's last ruler, Queen Lili'uokalani.87 The Republic,
eager for Hawaii to join American statehood, ceded 1,800,000
acres of crown, government, and public lands to the United States
"without the consent of or compensation to the Native Hawaiian
people... or their sovereign government."8
As part of the Hawaii Admission Act, 9 the United States re-
quired Hawaii to adopt the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of
1920 ("HHCA"), 9 ° which set aside certain lands for the "rehabili-
tation of Native Hawaiians."9 Specifically, under the provisions
of the HHCA, the United States returned to Hawaii 200,000 acres
81. KUYKENDALL & DAY, supra note 9, at 5.
82. Id. at 7.
83. Apology Resolution, 107 Stat. at 1510.
84. Brief of Amici Curiae The Hou Hawaiians and Maui Loa Native Hawaiian Benefi-
ciaries at 5, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818).
85. Id.
86. See Apology Resolution, 107 Stat. at 1510; see also KUYKENDALL & DAY, supra
note 9, at 177-78.
87. See KUYKENDALL & DAY, supra note 9, at 174-79.
88. Apology Resolution, 107 Stat. at 1512.
89. Hawaii Admission Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-83, 73 Stat. 4 (1959).
90. Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920, ch. 42, 42 Stat. 108 (1921). The HHCA
is incorporated into section 4 of the Hawaii Admission Act. Hawaii Admission Act § 4.
91. Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1551 (D. Haw. 1997).
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of the 1,800,000 acres originally ceded for the betterment of Na-
tive Hawaiians92 "[a]s a compact with the United States relating
to the management and disposition of [those lands]."" The United
States required Hawaii to incorporate the HHCA into its own
state constitution. 94 In addition, Congress conveyed to Hawaii the
bulk of the other lands ceded to the United States in 1898 and re-
quired that Hawaii hold the lands in a "public trust" for "the bet-
terment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians, as defined in the
[HHCA]."95 Under the HHCA, "Native Hawaiian" was defined to
include "any descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood
of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778." "9
The legislative history behind the HHCA makes clear that
Congress likened Native Hawaiians to Indian tribes by declaring
that "previous enactments granting [American] Indians... spe-
cial privileges in obtaining and using public lands" justified the
HHCA. 7 Congress has also stated that "[i]n recognition of the
special relationship which exists between the United States and
the Native Hawaiian people, [it] has extended to Native Hawai-
ians the same rights and privileges accorded to American Indian,
Alaska Native, Eskimo, and Aleut communities.""8
In 1978, Hawaii amended its constitution to establish the OHA
to better "address the needs of the aboriginal class of people of
Hawaii."99 By statute, the OHA was charged with using twenty
percent of the proceeds from the 1,800,000 acres returned to Ha-
waii under the Admission Act solely for the benefit of Native Ha-
waiians.' °
The amendment gave the OHA the power to administer the re-
sulting trust.'0 ' The amendment also required that all officers of
the OHA be "Hawaiians" and that only "Hawaiians," as defined
92. See Hawaiian Homes Commission Act § 203.
93. Hawaii Admission Act § 4.
94. Id.
95. Id. §§ 5(b), (f).
96. Hawaiian Homes Commission Act § 201(7) (omitted from 48 U.S.C. § 691 in light
of Hawaii's admission into Union).
97. H.R. REP. No. 66-839, at 11 (1920).
98. Native Hawaiian Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7902(13) (1994) (emphasis added).
99. HAw. REV. STAT. § 10-1(a) (1993).
100. See id. §§ 10-3(1), -13.5 (1993).
101. HAw. CONST. art. XII, § 6.
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by the law, would be allowed to vote for the OHA trustees. 10 2 The
term "Hawaiian" was added to bring state law "in line with the
current federal policy of the Federal government to extend bene-
fits for Hawaiians to all Hawaiians regardless of blood quan-
tuM."
103
IV. THE CASE
A. Procedural History
1. The District Court
Rice, who is no more a "Native Hawaiian" than the "descen-
dants of Miles Standish are American Indians," °4 sued Hawaii in
102. Id. See supra note 5 for the statutory definitions of "Hawaiian" and "Native Ha-
waiian."
103. 16 U.S.C. § 470w(17) (1994) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Apology Resolution, 107
Stat. at 1513. Congress has enacted a myriad of laws that classify Native Hawaiians as
Native Americans and include them in Native American benefit programs. See, e.g.,
Workforce Investment Act of 1998, 29 U.S.C. § 2911 (Supp. 1998) (regarding employment
programs for Native Hawaiians and other Native Americans); Drug Abuse Prevention,
Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1177(d) (1994) (giving preferences to po-
tential grantees-this law is targeted to fight drug abuse among Native Americans, which
under this law includes Native Hawaiians); National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 470a(d)(6) (1994) (providing protection to properties with cultural and religious impor-
tance to Indian tribes and Native Hawaiians); National Museum of the American Indian
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q to 80q-12, 80q-14 (1994) (requiring the return of Native Hawaiian
human remains and funerary objects, as well as the creation of a museum exclusively for
the preservation and study of the history and artifacts of Native Americans, a group of in-
dividuals statutorily defined to include Native Hawaiians); Native Hawaiian Education
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7912 (1994) (aimed at facilitating the education of Native Hawai-
ians); Native American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1994) (including Native
Hawaiian languages in the group of Native American languages accorded statutory pro-
tection); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013
(1994) (requiring the return of Native Hawaiian Human remains and funerary objects); 42
U.S.C. § 254s (1994) (providing for health care scholarships for Native Hawaiian stu-
dents); American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994) (promising to
preserve Native Hawaiian religious beliefs as a subset of religions described in the statu-
tory heading as "Native American"); Native American Programs Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§
2991-2992 (1994) (including Native Hawaiians in an array of Native American financial
and benefit programs); Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treat-
ment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4577(c)(4) (1994) (giving preferences to
applications targeted at fighting drug abuse among Native Hawaiians and other Native
Americans); Native Hawaiian Health Care Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11701-11714
(1994) (facilitating the improvement of health care for Native Hawaiians); Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 958, 104 Stat. 4079,
4422-23 (1990) (giving preferences for Native Hawaiians in HUD housing assistance pro-
grams).
104. Respondent's Brief at 11, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818).
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the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, °5
claiming the OHA voting scheme violated both the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution."°6
The district court upheld Hawaii's voting scheme, relying in
large measure on the Supreme Court's decision in Morton v.
Mancari°7 and its progeny.0 The district court applied rational
basis review to Hawaii's voting law, reasoning that the law would
not violate the Constitution if it was rationally tied to the fulfill-
ment of the unique obligation to the Native Hawaiians."°9
In Mancari, non-Indian employees of the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs ("BIA") challenged its hiring preference, which was designed
to give Native Americans greater participation in their own self-
government." 0 The plaintiffs in Mancari argued that the prefer-
ence violated the anti-discrimination provisions of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972."' The Supreme Court rejected
their argument, finding that there is "a special relationship" be-
tween the United States and the Indian tribes, and that the ple-
nary power of Congress to legislate with respect to the tribes is
found in the Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Con-
stitution.12
105. Rice, 528 U.S. at 510.
106. Id.
107. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
108. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Wash-
ington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979); Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463 (1979); Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); N. Cheyenne
Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,
425 U.S. 463 (1976); Rupert v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34-35 (1st
Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
109. See Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547 (D. Haw. 1997).
110. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1974).
11L Id. The operative provision of the Equal Employment Act is found at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16(a) (1994).
112. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551-52. The Indian Commerce Clause provides that "[tihe
Congress shall have the power... [to regulate commerce ... with the Indian tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Mancari Court also identified the treaty making power as an-
other source of the federal government's power over Indian affairs. See Mancari, 417 U.S.
at 552. The Treaty Clause reads, "[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. But see
Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal
Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1761 (1997) ("I have suggested that.., the Court
implicitly embraced the notion that power over Indian affairs is an unwritten, inherent
power of national sovereignty necessitated by the colonial nature of the United States.").
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While acknowledging that Native Hawaiians do not enjoy the
same "special relationship" with the federal government as In-
dian tribes, the district court drew a parallel between the status
of Native Americans and the "trust relationship" Congress im-
pliedly created with the Native Hawaiians under the HHCA."'
Thus, the district court reasoned, Mancari controlled since the
preferential classifications in Mancari and Rice, while facially
race-based, were actually rooted in legal or political status.1 4
Rice argued that Mancari did not apply since Native Hawai-
ians are not an organized tribe, but simply a racial class." 5 As
such, he argued that the state of Hawaii could not create a tribe
among the "Native Hawaiians" and "invest it with powers of self-
government.""6 In making this argument, which the Supreme
Court would later find compelling,"7 Rice relied on Washington v.
Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, " 8 in
which the Court held that only the federal government had the
power to enact legislation singling out Indians for preferential
treatment and that the states do not enjoy the same unique rela-
tionship with the Indians."'
Noting that legislation based upon racial classifications is con-
stitutionally suspect under the Equal Protection Clause and
should be viewed under strict scrutiny, 2 ° the district court
pointed out that, where Native Americans are concerned, the Su-
113. See Rice, 963 F. Supp. at 1552-53; see also Keaukaha-Panaewa Cmty. Ass'n v.
Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that Congress owes
the Native Hawaiians a "trust obligation" as a "compact with the United States").
114. See Rice, 963 F. Supp. at 1554.
115. Id. at 1549.
116. Id. at 1555.
117. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 518-22 (2000).
118. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
119. Id. at 500-01. Actually, the Court in Yakima, while recognizing that states gener-
ally do not have the same special relationship with Indians that the federal government
has, nonetheless concluded that because the state law at issue was enacted "in response to
a federal measure" intended to achieve the result accomplished by the challenged state
law, the state law itself need only "rationally furthe[r] the purpose identified by the State."
Id. (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per cu-
riam)).
120. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (holding
that all governmental programs with race-based preferences designed to benefit minori-
ties, including Native Americans, must be subject to strict scrutiny). As discussed infra
Part V, strict scrutiny requires that the government show that a particular law is nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest asserted.
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preme Court has applied the more relaxed rational basis analy-
sis. 121 To pass strict scrutiny analysis, a program must serve a
compelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.122 Under the more lenient rational basis
test, however, a state program need only be rationally tied to the
advancement of an asserted governmental interest.12 3
The court cited Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,'24 a land-
mark decision in which the Supreme Court held that all govern-
ment programs with race-based preferences would be subject to
strict scrutiny.125 Adarand led some commentators to conclude
that all legislation designed to benefit Native Hawaiians would
face strict scrutiny in equal protection challenges. 126 Finding the
status of Native Hawaiians equivalent to that of Native American
tribes, however, the district court applied rational basis review
and concluded there was a rational relation between the OHA
voting scheme and Hawaii's interest in using revenues from the
OHA-administered land trust for the improvement of Native Ha-
127
waiians.
Thus, the district court found that Hawaii had simply limited
the electoral franchise to the beneficiaries of the OHA's pro-
grams-the indigenous people who were the subjects of the trust
obligation. 21 More specifically, the district court held that the
OHA was enacted in response to federal legislation designed to
improve the lives of Native Hawaiians and that the OHA's voting
provisions were passed pursuant to the HHCA.129 The district
court concluded that Hawaii "had merely enacted a reasonable
12L Rice, 963 F. Supp. at 1550; see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974)
(holding that with respect to Native American tribes, race-conscious legislation is valid
under the less stringent rational basis test).
122. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 505 (1989).
123. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 531-32 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55
(1974)).
124. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
125. Id.
126. See Benjamin, supra note 19. But cf. Frickey, supra note 112; Van Dyke, supra
note 19.
127. See Rice, 963 F. Supp. at 1555.
128. Id.
129. Id. Consequently, the legislation would be upheld if it could be tied rationally to
the fulfillment of the federal government's unique obligation to Native Hawaiians. Id.
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method to satisfy its obligation to utilize a portion of the [reve-
nues] ... for the betterment of Native Hawaiians."3 °
2. The Ninth Circuit
In a less exhaustive opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's ruling. 3' The circuit court likewise reasoned that
if the land trust was properly set aside for Native Hawaiians, the
state properly established the OHA to administer the trust, and
the OHA was governed by trustees whose members were Hawai-
ian, it followed that the state might rationally conclude that Ha-
waiians, as the group to whom the trust obligations ran, should
be the group to elect the trustees. 2
The circuit court further held that even if Adarand applied, the
OHA voting scheme would survive strict scrutiny because the
classification was based on the "special trust relationship" be-
tween Hawaii and the Native Hawaiians. 3' However, the court
found that Adarand did not apply for two reasons: first, the OHA
voter restriction was not primarily racial in context, and second,
the eligibility requirement in Rice was not a preference of the sort
at issue in Adarand 34
The court seemed to construe Adarand as a narrowly held af-
firmative action decision, not of the sort that should control in
Rice. Rather, the Ninth Circuit viewed the OHA voting restriction
as analogous to the landowner limitation at issue in Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District.35 As discussed
in Part II.B., the Salyer line of cases are referred to as "special
purpose district" cases in which courts have upheld voting limita-
tions applied to groups on whom a particular election has a dis-
proportionate impact when compared to the population at
large. 36
130. Id.
131. See Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 528 U.S. 495
(2000).
132. Id. at 1079.
133. Id. at 1082.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973)).
136. Salyer, 410 U.S. at 733. In Salyer, the Supreme Court upheld a voter qualification
statute which restricted voting to landowners only and apportioned voting power for direc-
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3. The Supreme Court
a. The Majority Opinion
Thus, twice defeated, Rice appealed to the Supreme Court.13 1
The plight of Native Hawaiians was far from settled. 38 In light of
the fact that no other state program resembled Hawaii's, the case
raised broad questions about making race a condition of eligibility
for public benefits. 139 There were, of course, issues of great mo-
ment and difficulty with which the Court could grapple, not the
least being whether the Court would view Rice through the lens
of Adarand and apply strict scrutiny, or whether Rice should be
decided as a "special purpose district" case of the sort in Salyer.4 °
Interestingly, the Court chose neither path.
Rather than squarely evaluate the merits of Rice's claims, the
Court took steady aim at Hawaii's three principal defenses of its
voting law and rejected each one.' The majority avoided ana-
lyzing the case under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protec-
tion guarantee, an approach that could have had much broader
implications for government programs that confer benefits on the
basis of race." Instead, the Court viewed the OHA voting scheme
as an affront to the Fifteenth Amendment, holding that there is
no such thing as benign discrimination.
The Court announced that it would not decide whether Con-
gress may treat Native Hawaiians as it does Indian tribes, refer-
ring to such a consideration as "difficult terrain."' Moreover, the
Court rejected the relevance of Mancari, holding that to extend
Mancari to Rice would be to say that Congress could authorize a
state to create a voting scheme limiting an electorate for its pub-
tors of the water district upon the assessed valuation of the landowner's property. Id. at
724-25, 733.
137. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 511 (2000).
138. Compare Van Dyke, supra note 19, with Benjamin, supra note 19.
139. See Greenhouse, supra note 14.
140. Id.
14L Rice, 528 U.S. at 517-23.
142. By deciding the case solely under the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court avoided
having to determine whether Adarand mandated that strict scrutiny be applied in all
cases where race is used as a pretext for preferential treatment in government programs.
143. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Void Hawaii Setup That Limits a Vote by Race,
N.Y. Tn Es, Feb. 24, 2000, at A16.
144. Rice, 528 U.S. at 519.
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lic officials to a racial class, to the exclusion of all non-members of
that class.'45 At the core of the Court's analysis was the fact that
the non-Indian plaintiffs in Mancari were ineligible for the Bu-
reau's hiring preferences not because they were non-Indian, but
because they were not part of a "quasi-sovereign" tribe that en-
joyed a "special trust relationship" with the federal govern-
ment.4 ' The OHA elections, by contrast, were an affair of the
State of Hawaii.'47 Thus, "[tihe validity of the voting restriction
[was] the only question before" the Court." It concluded that to
apply Mancari to Rice would essentially permit a state to "fence
out whole classes of its citizens from decision making in critical
state affairs."1
The Court wasted no time dispensing with Hawaii's claim that
the OHA voting scheme was sustainable under the line of "special
purpose districts" cases such as Salyer.5 ' The Court held that the
Sayler decision did not suggest that compliance with the one per-
son-one vote requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment excused
compliance with the Fifteenth Amendment. 5' In other words,
Salyer did not implicate the Fifteenth Amendment.
Turning to Hawaii's final argument-that the voting restric-
tion did no more than ensure an alignment of interests between
fiduciaries and beneficiaries of a trust and that the restriction
was not based on race-the Court pointed out that while the
revenues from the trust were statutorily designated for "Native
Hawaiians," both Native Hawaiians and Hawaiians were allowed
to vote.'52 The Court concluded that the restriction created rather
than eliminated a differential alignment between the trustees
and the so-called beneficiaries.' 53 The majority held that Hawaii's
argument foundered on even more basic grounds, namely the un-
constitutional premise that citizens of a particular race are more
qualified to vote on certain matters than others.5
145. Id. at 520.
146. Id. (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 521.
149. Id. at 522.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 523.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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b. The Concurrence
Justices Breyer and Souter concurred in the result,5 ' finding
that Hawaii's argument failed on two grounds: first, there was no
"trust" for Native Hawaiians, and second, the electorate, as de-
fined by statute, did not constitute a "tribe."'56 To accept that a
trust existed under the Hawaii Admission Act, one had to recog-
nize its clear language, which required that revenues from the
ceded lands were to benefit all Hawaiians as well as for the "bet-
terment" of those who are native.'57 Justice Breyer argued that
the OHA electorate, as defined by statute, accommodated far too
many groups to constitute anything analogous to a tribe.' Jus-
tice Breyer made light of the fact that the actual provision defin-
ing the class benefitting from the trust came from the HHCA.6 9
Justice Breyer also pointed out that the OHA was simply a spe-
cial purpose branch of the state government, and thus, the Fif-
teenth Amendment applied.'
c. The Dissent
Relying on three principles, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg ar-
gued that the OHA voting provision did not violate either the
Fourteenth or the Fifteenth Amendment."6' "First, the Federal
Government must be, and has been, afforded wide latitude in car-
rying out its obligations arising from the special relationship it
has with the aboriginal peoples, a category that includes the na-
tive Hawaiians.""6 2 In addition, Justice Stevens argued that there
existed a fiduciary responsibility arising from the establishment
of a public trust for administering assets granted to it by the fed-
155. Id. at 524 (Breyer, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 525 (Breyer, J., concurring).
157. See HAW. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1-3; Rice, 528 U.S. at 525 (Breyer, J., concurring).
158. Rice, 528 U.S. at 526 (Breyer, J., concurring).
159. See id. at 525 (Breyer, J., concurring). For the definitions at issue in Rice, see su-
pra notes 95, 101, and accompanying text.
160. Id. at 526 (Breyer, J., concurring).
16L Id. at 527 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 529 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent points out that there are more
than 150 laws passed by Congress that recognize Native Hawaiians as Native Americans.
'By classifying native Hawaiians as 'Native Americans' for purposes of these statutes,
Congress has made clear that native Hawaiians enjoy many of 'the same rights and privi-
leges accorded to the American Indian, Alaska Native, Eskimo, and Aleut communities.'"
Id. at 533-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11701(19) (1994)).
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eral government for the benefit of Native Hawaiians.163 Finally,
"there [was] simply no invidious discrimination present in [Ha-
waii's] effort to see that indigenous peoples [were] compensated
for past wrongs."164
Looking squarely to the Court's analysis in Mancari, Justice
Stevens rejected the majority's application of strict scrutiny.'65
He argued instead that, when it comes to the exercise of Con-
gress's plenary power in Indian affairs, the Court has on numer-
ous occasions applied rational basis review when dealing with
legislation involving Indian preferences. 66
With respect to whether Native Hawaiians may be viewed as a
"tribe," Justice Stevens suggested only that it would be ironic "to
conclude that native Hawaiians are not entitled to special bene-
fits designed to restore a measure of native self-governance be-
cause they currently lack any vestigial native government-a
possibility of which the history and the actions of this Nation
have deprived them."
6 7
Justice Stevens rejected the majority's view that Congress did
not have the authority to delegate to the states the power to de-
vise a voting scheme such as the OHA's. 68 He relied on Washing-
ton v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion,"'69 in which the Court held that a state law involving
preferential treatment of Indians enacted in response to a federal
measure needed only to "'rationally further the purpose identified
by the State.""7 Since the OHA voting scheme was merely in-
tended to implement the wishes of the federal government, it nec-
essarily survived the rational basis review by promoting the self-
government of Native Hawaiians. 7'
163. Id. at 529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 534 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 531-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "as 'long as the special treat-
ment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation towards the
Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed'") (quoting Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 545-55 (1974)).
167. Id. at 535 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
170. Rice, 528 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mass. Bd. of'Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam)); see also Yakima, 439 U.S. at 500-501.
171. Rice, 528 U.S. at 538 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens rejected Rice's Fifteenth Amendment challenge
by arguing that while "[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race,"1 7 2 one
might also conclude that one's ancestry does not necessarily de-
termine one's apparent or acknowledged race today.'73 The OHA
eligibility requirement was a function of lineal descent, not the
blood-based characteristics of a particular Hawaiian resident. 74
V. BEHIND RICE'S LEGAL CURTAIN
Viewed broadly, the body of law concerning Native Hawaiians
and Native Americans generally involves two approaches: one
emphasizing the linkage between law and deprivation,'75 and an-
other, more optimistic approach, focusing on tribal survival. 7 6
The law/deprivation approach is perhaps best demonstrated in
Johnson v. McIntosh, 7 the early landmark decision in which
Chief Justice John Marshall held that the "discovery" of North
America meant the "conquest" of North America, and conse-
quently, the law of the conqueror prevailed over the law of the
conquered.
7 1
Alternatively, the "tribal survival" approach is most clearly re-
flected in cases such as Mancari. The Mancari decision recog-
nized the basic historical truth that now, over five centuries since
Europeans first made contact with what is now the continental
United States, and more than two centuries since the West began
its incursion into Hawaii, colonization remains incomplete. 79 The
federal government today recognizes more than 500 Native
American tribes,8 ° according them a variety of self-governmental
powers.' 8 '
Like the civil rights cases of the 1950s and 1960s, there is a
172. Id. at 514.
173. Id. at 539 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. See Frickey, supra note 112, at 1754-55.
176. See id. at 1755.
177. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
178. See id. at 588-91.
179. See, e.g., L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compro-
mising Sovere4nty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 53, 58 (1994).
180. Id.
18L See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-26 (1978).
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remedial element inherent in Native American law." 2 It seems
clear, for instance, that the courts and Congress have come a long
way from Marshall's "divide and conquer" holding in Johnson.
Indian tribes have retained elements of "quasi-sovereign"
authority ever since they ceded their lands to the United States
and announced their dependence on the federal government.' 13 As
recognized citizens and residents of the United States, Indians
are endowed with the rights, privileges, and immunities equal to
those enjoyed by all other U.S. citizens.8 4 Moreover, Indians are
given special preference for certain types of employment,'85 and
Congress has enacted legislation to ensure maximum Native
American participation in educational services and other pro-
grams benefitting Indian communities so the needs of Native
Americans will be met more immediately. 6
A. The Special Relationship Doctrine
The United States Constitution allocates to Congress the ple-
nary power to legislate with respect to Indian affairs.'8 7 As early
as Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 the Court defined "Indians" or "tribes"
as "original inhabitants" or "natives"' 89-that is, those indigenous
people inhabiting the New World before the arrival of the first
Europeans. Thus, since the beginning of North American coloni-
zation, the "federal power to regulate and protect the Indians and
their property... has been recognized." 9 '
Congress's plenary power to legislate with respect to Indians,
or Native Americans, derives from at least four constitutional
182. Native Americans have been accorded numerous preferences over other American
citizens. See generally Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (granting tribe preferential fishing rights); Moe v. Con-
federated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976)
(granting tribes immunity from state taxation); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194
(1975) (granting tribe preferential hunting rights).
183. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
184. See Acosta v. County of San Diego, 272 P.2d 92, 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
185. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
186. See 25 U.S.C. § 450a (1994).
187. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 531 n.6 (1998);
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978); Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551-552.
188. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
189. Id. at 572-74.
190. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943).
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clauses: the Indian Commerce Clause, 9' the Treaty Clause,'92 the
Property Clause,'93 and the Debt Clause.'94 As the Court in Man-
cari noted, "[tihe plenary power of Congress to deal with the spe-
cial problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly
from the Constitution itself."'95 The Mancari Court echoed the
Court's insistence three decades prior that Congress's wide
authority to govern Indian affairs "cannot be doubted."'96
Indeed, today an entire title of the United States Code-Title
25-is devoted to "Indians," and in virtually every other title of
the Code, Indians and other North American "natives" are singled
out for special treatment in all manner of areas."'
While there is no legal duty incumbent upon Congress to re-
dress the wrongs committed by the West against the Indians, the
Supreme Court has steadfastly held that the federal government
may make amends as its judgment dictates.9 8 Underscoring the
Court's view that the judiciary should take an active role in re-
mediation efforts toward Indians for past wrongs, Justice Jack-
son, concurring in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v.
United States,'99 wrote:
The generation of Indians who suffered the privations, indignities,
and brutalities of the westward march of the whites have gone to the
Happy Hunting Ground, and nothing that we can do can square the
account with them. Whatever survives is a moral obligation resting
on the descendants of the whites to do for the descendants of the In-
dians what in the conditions of this twentieth century is the decent
thing.20
0
While it is true that both Congress and the Court have referred
191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., Venetie, 522 U.S. at 531 n.6.
192. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2; see, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973).
193. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2; see, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-
80(1886).
194. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1; see, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448
U.S. 371, 397 (1980).
195. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551-52.
196. Board of Comm'rs of Creek County v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943).
197. See, e.g., Native Hawaiian Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7902(13) (1994).
198. See Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335
(1945).
199. 324 U.S. 335 (1945).
200. Id. at 355 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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to the Native American Indians in terms of race,2"' the Court has
nevertheless held that its decisions "leave no doubt that federal
legislation with respect to Indian tribes, although relating to In-
dians as such, is not based upon impermissible racial classifica-
tions."2 °2 To be sure, the Court has never suggested that legisla-
tion with preferences for Indians are "race-based" within the
meaning of the Civil War Amendments. Put simply, the mere fact
that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have
not, since their adoption, circumscribed Congress's plenary power
to legislate in Indian affairs begs the conclusion that the term
"raced-based" has nothing at all to do with race within the
meaning of those amendments.
In fact, the Court, in Washington v. Confederated Bands &
Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, expressly held that "the ar-
gument that [Indian] classifications are 'suspect' [is] an untenable
one."" 3 As of now, the Court's position that racial classifications
expressing a preference for Indians are not suspect has remained
nothing short of unshakeable.
Or has it, in light of Rice? Before turning to the probable im-
pact of the Rice decision, discussed in Part VI, it is helpful to ex-
plore the implications of the Court's unwillingness to consider
whether Congress may treat Native Hawaiians as it does the In-
dian tribes.
First, the Court's refusal to consider whether Native Hawai-
ians enjoy a "special relationship" with the federal government is
disingenuous at best. The Court, after all, suggested that Native
Hawaiians may "have a status like that of Indians in organized
tribes, and that [Congress] may, and has, delegated to the State a
broad authority to preserve that status."2 °4 As Justice Breyer
201. See, e.g., United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926) ("'Indian tribe...
[refers to] a body of Indians of the same or similar race." (emphasis added) (quoting Mon-
toya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1992))); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
567, 573 (1846) (tribe "does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally,-of
the family of Indians" (emphasis added)).
202. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977).
203. 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979). For more on the Court's insistence that racial classifica-
tions with respect to Indians are not "suspect" or "impermissible," see Washington v.
Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979);
Yakima, 439 U.S. at 500-02; Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645-46; Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v.
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85-90 (1977); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425
U.S. 463, 479-80 (1976); Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-91 (1976).
204. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 518 (2000).
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noted glibly in his concurrence, "[the Court] assumes without de-
ciding that the State could 'treat Hawaiians or native Hawaiians
as tribes.' 2 °5
The silent assumption to which Justice Breyer referred finds
ample support in the fact that Congress has enacted a myriad of
laws recognizing a special relationship between the federal gov-
ernment and the Native Hawaiians.0 6 If indeed the majority
placed the cart before the horse-that is, decided the case in ad-
vance of any meaningful consideration of Native Hawaiians'
status-the horse, then, is most certainly the laws referenced
above. The majority's silence on this issue clearly ignores the re-
ality the Ninth Circuit recognized: the OHA voting restriction
is rooted in historical concern for the Hawaiian race, going back at
least to the [HHCA], carried through statehood when Hawaii ac-
knowledged a trust obligation toward Native Hawaiians as a condi-
tion of admission to the union, and on to 1993, when Congress
passed a Joint Resolution "apologiz[ing] to Native Hawaiians on be-
half of the people of the United States."
207
The Rice majority turned a blind eye to the scores of instances
in which Congress has included "Native Hawaiians"-which it
has defined as any descendant of the Islands' inhabitants prior to
1778, without regard to blood quantum-in statutory programs
benefitting indigenous people nationwide.2 °s Congress has repeat-
edly affirmed the "special trust" relationship the federal govern-
ment enjoys with the Native Hawaiians and has specifically rec-
ognized Hawaiians as a "distinct and unique indigenous
people."20 9
As amici for Hawaii crisply analogized the dilemma, under the
terms of the HHCA, the "benefits conferred by... the trust ...
are no more a racial classification than the law providing com-
pensation to Japanese internees during World War II.
"1210
205. Id. at 524 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Rice, 528 U.S. at 519).
206. See, e.g., Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
at 673; Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645-47; Weeks, 430 U.S. at 84-85; Moe, 425 U.S. at 479-80;
Fisher, 424 U.S. at 390-91; see also supra note 103.
207. Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Apology Resolution,
107 Stat. 1510 (1993)).
208. See supra note 103.
209. 20 U.S.C. § 7902(1), (10) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 11701(1), (13), (15), (16), (18) (1994).
210. Brief of Amici Curiae Hou Hawaiians and Maui Loa, Native American Benefici-
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B. Power Struggle: The Feds v. the State
The Court was adamant in holding that the OHA is wholly an
affair of the state, and that Congress may not delegate to the
states the power to enact laws fulfilling their trust obligations to
Native Americans.21' The Court held flatly, "Congress may not
authorize a State to create a voting scheme of this sort."212 The
Court relied on Yakima for support, but the Court in Yakima,
while recognizing that states generally do not have the same spe-
cial relationship with Indians as the federal government, upheld
a state law enacted to further a federal measure.213
In that case, the Yakima Indian Nation challenged a law that
extended the state of Washington's "jurisdiction over Indians and
Indian territory within the State."214 Rejecting the Yakima Indian
Nation's equal protection challenge to the law, the Court recog-
nized that the "[sitates do not enjoy th[e] same unique relation-
ship with Indians [as the federal government]. " '5 The Court,
however, was careful to articulate that the states may legislate in
Indian affairs if the legislation is made pursuant to a federal
law.2"6 Specifically, the law at issue in Yakima was not another
state law per se, but "was enacted in response to a federal meas-
ure explicitly designed to [deal with the Indians.]"2 7 To be sure,
Hawaii's voting scheme fell within the context of Yakima, since it
was enacted pursuant to the federally enacted HHCA.1 8
C. The "Tribal" Threshold and its Ambiguities
Crucial to the analysis of the Rice decision was the Court's de-
termination that Mancari was not controlling. The Court's rejec-
tion of Mancari's relevance to the facts of Rice reflects the Court's
express abrogation of the need to determine whether Native Ha-
aries at 8, Rice, 528 U.S. 495 (No. 98-818).
211. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 536 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 519.
213. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979).
214 Id. at 465.
215. Id. at 501.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Respondent's Brief at 6-7,Rice, 528 U.S. 495 (No. 98-818).
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waiians enjoy the same special relationship with the federal gov-
ernment as the Indians. Putting aside for the moment Justice
Breyer's barb that the majority assumed what it chose not to de-
cide,219 a brief analysis of Mancari, as it relates to the "tribal
threshold" requirement, is important.
In Mancari, the Court rested its opinion on, inter alia, the "spe-
cial relationship" doctrine discussed in Part IV.A. Most impor-
tantly, the Court found it significant that the Indians in Mancari
were "tribal" in nature.2 ' This "tribal" classification, which sug-
gests that organization and structure inhere in Indian culture,
accomplished two important things for the Rice Court's calculus.
First, it transformed the Indians into quasi-political entities, not
racial bodies, thus negating any challenge that the Bureau's pref-
erence was rooted in a "racial," and therefore "suspect," classifi-
cation.22' Second, the Indians' "tribal" status supplied the criti-
cal link to the Indian Commerce Clause, which provides Congress
with the power to "regulate commerce... with the Indian
Tribes."222
While it is true that the Native Hawaiians are not a federally
recognized tribe, the Court in Rice took the short view of history,
and an even shorter view of existing law by deciding the case
solely on Fifteenth Amendment grounds without giving proper at-
tention to the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It would seem that an appropriate equal protection
inquiry would have compelled the Court to determine just what
status Native Hawaiians have.
The Mancari Court upheld the BIA's preference because of the
federal government's special relationship with the Indians, not
because the Indians were tribal in nature. The Court focused on
the Indians' tribal status only to the extent that the preference
challenged included as a requirement for eligibility that benefici-
aries be members of "federally recognized tribes."223 Indeed, that
was the express language of the law.224
219. Rice, 528 U.S. at 524 (Breyer, J., concurring).
220. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
221. Id.
222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
223. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554 n.24.
224. Id.
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The "tribal membership" requirement was not, however, the
principal ground on which the Court rested its holding. Rather,
the Mancari Court recognized the "unique legal status of Indian
tribes under federal law and upon the plenary power of Congress,
based on... the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status, to legis-
late on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes."225
Indeed, the scope of Mancari is as narrow as the issue in Rice.
In Mancari, as in Rice, the purpose of the preference was to give
indigenous people, who historically had been deprived of land and
self-determination, greater participation in their own self-
government, and to advance the government's trust obligations.226
Thus, in Rice the Court misapprehended-if not plainly mis-
read-its prior logic in Mancari. Tribal membership was not the
threshold issue in Mancari; rather, it was the special relationship
doctrine.227
As such, one could construe Rice as overruling Mancari. The
Rice majority adamantly held that Mancari was not controlling
since the Indians in Mancari had a special relationship with the
government, and the Native Hawaiians in Rice did not.228 This is
clearly not the case, if one is to place any stock in existing law.229
But Mancari is itself an interestingly flawed decision in at
least two respects.' First, while the Mancari Court held that the
plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs was rooted in the
Indian Commerce Clause,231 in United States v. Kagama,232 the
Court expressly rejected the clause as the source of such awesome
congressional power.233 The Kagama Court's rejection of the In-
dian Commerce Clause as the source of Congress's plenary power
over Indians would seem to dilute what little emphasis the Man-
cari Court placed on "tribal membership."234 Second, that the
225. Id. at 551 (emphasis added); see also Respondent's Brief at 30, Rice, 528 U.S. 495
(No. 98-818) (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551).
226. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552.
227. Id.
228. Rice, 528 U.S. at 518.
229. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
230. See Frickey, supra note 112, at 1763.
231. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552.
232. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
233. Id. at 385.
234. See Frickey, supra note 112, at 1763.
HAWAII STATUTE
"tribal" affiliation rendered the preference in Mancari "political"
rather than "racial" is a fallacy since blood quantum was a "but
for" requirement of the preference. 235 Thus, it is difficult to square
the majority's rejection of Mancari, where the preference was
rooted in a racial classification, with the ancestral classification
in Rice.
Of even greater significance to the Court's reasoning in Rice is
the issue it expressly chose not to ponder-whether Native Ha-
waiians may be treated as Indian tribes. Specifically, Congress
has expressly excluded Native Hawaiians from the "tribal mem-
bership" requirement. It "has extended to Native Hawaiians the
same rights and privileges accorded to American Indian, Alaska
Native, Eskimo, and Aleut communities."236 The Rice Court thus
failed to acknowledge the fact that it is the legal or political
status of Native Hawaiians, not whether they are "tribal" entities,
that determines whether they may be treated by the federal gov-
ernment in the same way as Indian tribes.
To be sure, in light of Congress's express recognition that Na-
tive Hawaiians enjoy the same special relationship with the fed-
eral government as all other Native Americans, "'tribal status'...
is a poor proxy for determining whether Congress may legislate
with respect to a particular indigenous group."237
Furthermore, the Court's refusal to consider Rice's Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection challenge provided an escape hatch
through which it could avoid making the crucial determination of
whether Native Hawaiians enjoy the same special relationship
with the federal government as do the Indian tribes. As such, the
Rice decision is distinguished considerably from the Court's re-
cent voting rights cases. Specifically, in Shaw v. Reno,2 38 the
Court struck down a North Carolina legislative map that pro-
moted the interests of minority voters.23 9 Finding the electoral
235. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551. The employment preference at issue in Mancari
benefitted "qualified Indians." Id. at 538. The statute defined "Indians" as members of fed-
erally recognized tribes and "all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood." Id. at 553
n.24; see also Frickey, supra note 112.
236. 20 U.S.C. § 7902(13) (1994).
237. Respondent's Brief at 31, Rice, 528 U.S. 495 (No. 98-818).
238. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
239. Id. at 642.
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map unconstitutional on its face, the Shaw Court decided the
case solely on the Fourteenth Amendment grounds.24 °
The distinction between Rice and Shaw is notable because the
voting condition in Shaw did not expressly impose racial condi-
tions. Rather, the condition resulted in the disproportionate racial
impact of the legislative map as applied. In evaluating North
Carolina's voting scheme, the Court looked to the more funda-
mental equal protection inquiry that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires.241 While the Congressional map at issue in Shaw was
not facially race-based, like the scheme in Rice, it strains logic to
assume, as the Rice Court did, that a law may offend the Fif-
teenth Amendment without squarely implicating the Fourteenth.
To the extent that the Fifteenth Amendment expressly protects a
right embedded in the Fourteenth, the two are twin amendments.
The OHA voting restriction in Rice expressly required that the
electorate be limited to "Hawaiians" and "Native Hawaiians," as
defined by statute in terms of blood quantum.242 Consequently,
the Rice Court was able to attack the scheme as a per se offense
to the language of the Fifteenth Amendment.243 For sure, steering
clear of Rice's equal protection challenge made it possible for the
Court to avoid having to tread "that difficult terrain"2 of deter-
mining whether Congress-and by extension, the State of Ha-
waii-could treat Native Hawaiians as it does the Indian tribes.
Accordingly, the formula applied by the Rice Court comports with
its recent drive against any and all programs designed to benefit
a particular racial class.24 5 Congress has not, as of yet, shared this
sentiment.246
240. Id. at 640-41. The court stated:
Drawing on the "one person, one vote" principle [of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment], this Court recognized that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a di-
lution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a bal-
lot."... It is against this background that we confront the question presented
here.
Id. (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969)).
241. Id. at 649.
242. HAW. REv. STAT. § 10-2; see supra note 5.
243. Rice, 528 U.S. at 523.
244. Id. at 519.
245. See Biskupic, supra note 17.
246. See supra note 103 (listing a handful of the more than 160 laws that give prefer-
ences to Native Hawaiians and in which Congress has explicitly included "Native Hawai-
ians" in its definition of "Native American").
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D. The Applicable Standard: The Problem of Strict Scrutiny
Before the decision in Rice, several commentators suggested
that some doubt had been cast on whether the Court's decision in
Adarand Constructors v. Pena"7 would force laws aimed at bene-
fitting racial minorities to pass muster under strict scrutiny
analysis.2' That is, such a law would have to be narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling governmental interest.249 Indeed, the
Court in Adarand premised its decision on one simple notion:
"'[alny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must neces-
sarily receive a most searching examination.' 25
Adarand involved the question of what standard of review
should apply to congressionally enacted race-conscious set-
asides.25' The plaintiff in Adarand was a white-owned construc-
tion firm that submitted the lowest bid on a contract to supply
guardrails to a federal highway project in Colorado.252 Because of
a federal affirmative action program designed to give general con-
tractors incentives to hire minority-owned subcontractors, the bid
went to a minority-owned firm.253
Wishing "to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in
theory, but fatal in fact,"254 the Court nevertheless held that the
government bore the burden of proving that the affirmative ac-
tion program was narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling in-
terest in compensating for past discrimination. The Court re-
manded the case back to the lower court in order to make this
determination.255 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor con-
cluded that "whenever the government treats any person une-
247. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
248. See Benjamin, supra note 19. But cf Frickey, supra note 112; Van Dyke, supra
note 19.
249. See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
250. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 219 (quoting Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491
(1980)).
25L Id.
252. Id. at 205.
253. Id. The federal regulation at issue in Adarand involved Disadvantaged Business
Enterprises ("DBE"s). See id. at 205. DBEs were minority-owned firms that qualified for
special status under federal regulations. Id. at 206-09. Under the regulatory scheme, pri-
mary contractors were not required to award contracts to DBEs, but were given a strong
financial incentive by the federal government to do so (10% of the subcontract amount, or
1.5% of the amount of the primary contract, whichever was less). Id. at 209.
254. Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519).
255. See id. at 237-38.
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qually because of his or her race, that person has suffered an in-
jury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Con-
stitution's guarantee of equal protection."256
Adarand is important for three reasons. First, it stands for the
rule that both the federal and state governments must satisfy the
same strict scrutiny analysis for any race-based affirmative ac-
tion program."' Second, the strict scrutiny rule spelled out in
Adarand is not limited to minority set-asides; it applies to all do-
mains, such as education admissions and employment.258 Finally,
despite the seemingly broad sweep of Adarand, the Court sug-
gested it may be willing to grant Congress greater deference than
it would a state or local government. 5 9 For instance, the Court
might be more likely to accept congressional findings that there
had been discrimination in a particular domain, or at a particular
time in history, than it would from a state or local governmental
body.260
Of course, the question then remains: what does Adarand do to
Rice, or what should it have done? The answer, arguably, is
nothing. Because the Rice Court struck down Hawaii's voting
scheme solely on Fifteenth Amendment grounds, the Court
avoided any equal protection inquiry entirely.261 Had the Court
not ignored Rice's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection chal-
lenge, however, Adarand would most certainly have been impli-
cated. Indeed, the very commentators who scratched their heads
at the Adarand decision were clearly of the view that any chal-
lenge to race-based preferences benefitting Native Hawaiians
would necessarily implicate the clear "strict scrutiny" rule set
forth in Adarand.262
But there was, prior to the Rice decision, a polar view that
equal protection challenges to laws giving preferences to Native
256. Id. at 229.
257. See id. at 235 ("Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a
compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that inter-
est.").
258. Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring).
259. Id. at 230.
260. Id.
261. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 523 (2000).
262. See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 19, at 539 (arguing that in light of Adarand, if a
statutory "definition constitutes a racial classification.., all legislation treating Native
Hawaiians specially is presumptively invalid").
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Hawaiians based on race would not implicate Adarand.263 To
these commentators, either of two scenarios governed the fate of
the Native Hawaiians in light of Adarand.2 ' One, Congress had
clearly articulated that there exists a special relationship be-
tween the United States and the Native Hawaiian people.265 As
recently as the 1993 Apology Resolution,266 Congress expressly
stated that United States participation in the 1893 overthrow of
the Hawaiian Monarchy violated "treaties between the two na-
tions and... international law."26 Moreover, Congress was care-
ful to note that "Hawaii also ceded 1,800,000 acres of crown, gov-
ernment and public lands... without the consent of or
compensation to the Native Hawaiian people.., or their sover-
eign government."268 Because of the wrongs committed against
the Native Hawaiians by the United States-wrongs identical to
those committed against the Native Indians-Congress urged the
United States "to support reconciliation efforts between the
United States and the Native Hawaiian people."26 9
Thus, just as with the Indians in Mancari, Native Hawaiians
would be "judicially immunized" by the special relationship doc-
trine from equal protection challenges based on racial classifica-
tions.
The second, more complex analytical regime, sets forth the no-
tion that if Adarand is to be construed broadly, the decision nec-
essarily would have overruled scores of cases in which the Court
upheld racial preferences for IndiansY ° However, in Adarand,
the Court made clear that it was reluctant to reopen issues "in
which [it] found special deference to the political branches of the
Federal Government to be appropriate."27' It had been argued
that this "cryptic reference" by the Court suggested that it would
263. See, e.g., Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 100 (reasoning that because "courts have...
ruled consistently that programs for Native Hawaiians should be examined using the
same level of review (rational basis) that applies to programs for other Native Americans,"
any equal protection challenge of the sort in Rice would likely escape Adarand's grip).
264. See, e.g., id.
265. Id. at 107.
266. Apology Resolution, 107 Stat. 1510, 1513 (1993).
267. Id. at 1511.
268. Id. at 1512.
269. Id. at 1513.
270. Frickey, supra note 112, at 1766.
271. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218 (1995).
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"be reluctant to upset longstanding arrangements, even though
they might arguably involve some discriminatory element."272
This latter view reasoned that challenges of the sort in Rice
would escape strict scrutiny because of Adarand's implied excep-
tion to previous laws which gave preferences to Native Ameri-
cans. This view does not resolve the fate of future legislation with
preferences for Native Hawaiians, or, for that matter, Native In-
dian tribes.
In short, the Court left open the question whether strict scru-
tiny applies to race-based preferences for Native Hawaiians. By
ignoring out-of-hand Rice's Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion challenge to Hawaii's voting law, the Court left two critical
questions for commentators and, more significantly, Native Ha-
waiians to ponder. First, do the Native Hawaiians enjoy the same
special relationship with the United States as the Native Ameri-
cans? Second, what level of scrutiny should apply to laws that
give preferences to Native Hawaiians? The answer to the second
question, of course, is wholly dependent upon the answer to the
first. Sadly, the Court refused to offer any guidance on these im-
portant matters.
VI. THE IMPACT
Limited as it was to the OHA voting scheme, it is likely the
Rice decision will have no immediate implications beyond Hawaii.
It may well invite additional challenges to programs designed to
benefit Native Hawaiians, of which there are many, from pro-
grams financed by the revenues from public land administered in
trust for the Native Hawaiians, to tuition grants and home-
steading rights.273
While the Rice majority was careful to say that "we assume the
validity of the underlying administrative structure and trusts,
without intimating any opinion on that point,"274 the decision
nevertheless suggests that Native Hawaiians do not, more than
100 years after America's participation in the overthrow of the
Hawaiian monarchy, enjoy the same special relationship with the
272. Frickey, supra note 112, at 1766.
273. See Greenhouse, supra note 143, at A16.
274. Rice, 528 U.S. at 521-22.
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United States government as all other Native Americans. Indeed,
the question remains whether Native Hawaiians even are Native
Americans in the legal sense.
To be sure, the case has presented a call to politicians to intro-
duce legislation that would expressly recognize Native Hawaiians
as indigenous people who enjoy a trust relationship with the fed-
eral government and have a right to self-determination under
federal law.
In fact, on July 20, 2000, Senator Daniel Kahikina Akaka (D-
HI), along with Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI), introduced a bill
which, if adopted into law, would articulate once and for all the
United States' policy toward Native Hawaiians.275 Specifically,
the bill calls for Congress to recognize that "the Native Hawaiian
people wish to preserve, develop, and transmit to future Native
Hawaiian generations their ... political and cultural identity...
and to achieve greater self-determination over their own af-
fairs."276
If adopted into law, the bill would also provide that "the United
States has recognized and reaffirmed the special trust relation-
ship with the Native Hawaiian people through... the enactment
of the [Hawaiian Admission] Act."27 7 In addition, the bill would
establish within the Department of the Interior an Office of the
Special Trustee for Native Hawaiian Affairs. 7 ' Among the Trus-
tee's duties would be to "effectuate and coordinate the special
trust relationship between the Native Hawaiian people and the
United States."27 9
Senator Akaka has stated the primary purpose behind the bill
as follows:
When the State of Hawaii was admitted into the Union in 1959, the
prevailing Federal policy was the termination of Federal responsi-
bilities related to America's native people and the delegation of those
responsibilities to the several states. Accordingly, the Hawaii Admis-
sions Act provided that the State of Hawaii would assume a trust re-
sponsibility for lands that had been set aside under Federal law in
275. S. 2899, 106th Cong. (2000).
276. Id. § 1(15).
277. Id. § 1(18)(A) (emphasis added).
278. Id. § 4.
279. Id. § 4(b)(1).
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1921 in Hawaii for the benefit of Native Hawaiians, and further pro-
vided that the balance of other lands in Hawaii which were ceded
back to the State of Hawaii by the United States were required to be
held in a public trust for five purposes-one of which was the bet-
terment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians.280
This proposed legislation would make clear that the indigenous
native people of the United States, American Indians, Alaskan
Natives, and Native Hawaiians, have the same status under fed-
eral law and policy-the right to self-determination and self-
governance, and a federally recognized, government-to-
government relationship with the United States.28 '
Alternatively, should Senator Akaka's bill not reach a vote, or
otherwise vanish from the legislative blackboard, Hawaii could
open the OHA elections to everyone, make the agency's trustees
board-appointed rather than elected, or reorganize the OHA so
that it is no longer a state agency.28 2
Finally, there is of course the fear that the Rice ruling may un-
dermine the special status of the Indian tribes, which, unlike the
Native Hawaiians, conduct their own elections and have a myriad
of programs with preferences based on race. Such fears should be
quelled, however, by the Court's express language that in dealing
with preferences singling out members of Indian tribes for special
treatment, the Court has repeatedly recognized that the prefer-
ences were "'political rather than racial in nature.' 283
The Court drew a clear distinction between Hawaii's voting
scheme and tribal preferences by reasoning that "[i] f a non-Indian
lacks a right to vote in tribal elections, it is for the reason that
such elections are the internal affair of a quasi-sovereign."2" The
voting scheme at issue in Rice, by contrast, involved an affair of
the entire state of Hawaii. Yet, the ground on which this premise
rests is misguided: the Court has expressly held that a state may
enact legislation with preferences so long as the law is made pur-
280. Senator Daniel K. Akaka, Statement Regarding Indian Affairs Hearing on S. 2899
(Sept. 14, 2000), available at http://www.akaka2000.org/PRSeptl4.html.
281. Id.
282. See Greenhouse, supra note 143.
283. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 520 (2000) (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553
n.24).
284. Id.
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suant to a congressional mandate.28 5
Thus, by the Court's reasoning, tribal Indian voting schemes
are "immune" from judicial scrutiny because of the Indians' spe-
cial relationship status with the federal government-a classifica-
tion the Court, in spite of Congress, has yet to bestow upon the
Native Hawaiians.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Rice is signifi-
cant for five distinct reasons. First, Rice offers little in the way of
defining what, if any, special relationship Native Hawaiians en-
joy with the federal government. The Court avoided determining
whether Native Hawaiians enjoy a special trust relationship of
the sort that Native Americans do.286 Turning a blind eye to the
more than 160 congressional laws that include "Native Hawaiian"
in their definition of "Native American," the Court, as Justice
Breyer aptly noted in his concurring opinion, assumed without
deciding that Hawaii could treat Hawaiians or Native Hawaiians
as Indian tribes.287
Second, by rejecting Rice's Fourteenth Amendment equal pro-
tection challenge, the Court abrogated an opportunity to an-
nounce what level of scrutiny applies to government programs
that give preferences to Native Hawaiians. While one might as-
sume that Adarand is a narrowly held affirmative action decision
inapplicable to a Hawaiian voting restriction, an alternative
reading suggests Adarand should not apply at all to a law like the
one at issue in Rice-a law which on its face so squarely violated
the Fifteenth Amendment.
Still, Rice might seem to stand for the premise that any race-
based legislation designed to benefit Native Hawaiians will be
held to strict scrutiny, not the more relaxed rational basis review
standard accorded legislation favoring Native Americans. To be
sure, this was the fear expressed by commentators in light of
Adarand.8 8 But as we have seen, Adarand and all its legal impli-
285. See supra Part IV.B.
286. Rice, 528 U.S. at 518-19.
287. Id. at 524 (Breyer, J., concurring).
288. See Benjamin, supra note 19.
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cations with respect to raced-based preferences vanished from the
inquiry once the Court held that it could "stay far off that difficult
terrain"28 9 of determining whether Congress could treat Native
Hawaiians as it does the American Indians.
Third, in Rice, the Court once again defined the Salyer line of
cases, and in so doing held those cases irrelevant to the facts of
Rice."' Unlike the issues in the "special purpose district" cases,
the Court held that Rice did not implicate the one-person, one-
vote requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Had the Court
not dispensed with Rice's equal protection challenge, however, it
would have had to clarify whether the reasoning behind the
Salyer line of cases may extend beyond concerns surrounding the
ownership of real property to racial barriers in voting.
Fourth, the Rice decision is consistent with the Court's recent,
and not so recent, line of Fifteenth Amendment cases that
squarely target race-based conditions of voting. This seems what
the Court wished the decision to stand for when it held, in what is
the "soul" of the case:
The State's position rests, in the end, on the demeaning premise that
citizens of a particular race are somehow more qualified than others
to vote on certain matters. That reasoning attacks the central
meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment ....
When the culture and way of life of a people are all but engulfed by
a history beyond their control, their sense of loss may extend down
through generations; and their dismay may be shared by many
members of the larger community. As the State of Hawaii attempts
to address these realities, it must, as always, seek the political con-
sensus that begins with a sense of shared purpose. One of the neces-
sary beginning points is this principle: The Constitution of the
United States, too, has become the heritage of all the citizens of Ha-
waii.291
Finally, the Rice decision has galvanized the Hawaiian delega-
tion into political action. Senator Akaka has introduced a bill that
would officially recognize that "the Native Hawaiian people wish
to preserve, develop, and transmit to future Native Hawaiian
generations their ... political and cultural identity... and to
289. Rice, 528 U.S. at 519.
290. Id. at 522.
291. Id. at 523-24.
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achieve greater self-determination over their own affairs."29 2 More
significantly, the bill calls for Congress to recognize the "special
trust relationship between the Native Hawaiian people.... and
the United States."293 To be sure, such express Congressional lan-
guage, coupled with existing law classifying Native Hawaiians as
analogous to the Indian tribes, would have made it much more
difficult for the Rice Court to reach the decision it did.
William E. Spruill
292. S. 2889, 106th Cong. § 1(15) (2000).
293. Id. § 4.
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